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-BACKGROUND
CHARLES C. CALLAHAN*
Arthur St. Clair, newly appointed Governor of the Northwest Terri-
tory, arrived at Marietta July 9, 1788, having been preceded by two of
the territorial judges.1 These three were a majority of the officials and,
as such, were directed by the Ordinance of 1787 to "adopt and publish
. such laws of the original states, criminal and civil, as may be neces-
sary, and best suited to the circumstances of the district . ." Law
making began on July 25; a and 'before the year was out ten laws had
been published. They provided for a militia, established several inferior
courts with their terms and officers, regulated marriages, prescribed punish-
ments for seventeen crimes-and limited the times for commencing civil
actions and criminal prosecutions.
4
The first territorial statute of limitations may have been invalid from
the start because not a law of an original state;' and it was disapproved by
Congress in 1792.6 But in 1795 St. Clair and the judges published an-
other,' this time adopted from the laws of Pennsylvania,' which laws
copied, almost word for word, the English statute of 1623.' The repeal
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1James M. Varnum and Samuel Holden Parsons. The third judge, John
Cleves Symmes, the instigator of the Miami Purchase, arrived in time to sign a
law dated August 13, which established a court of probate.
limitations of from two to ten years on specified civil actions and of from two to
four years on prosecutions for crimes other than capital offenses.
2 Ordinance of July 13, 1787, §5.
8 Laws, N.W. Terr. c. 1 (1792).
4 Laws, N.W. Terr. c. 10 (1792). This law, published Dec. 28, 1788, placed
5 Whether the phrase "laws of the original states" in the ordinance was to be
interpreted literally was the subject of a running dispute between St. Clair and the
judges. See 1 MARSHALL, HISTORY OF THE CouRrs AD LAWYERS OF OHIO 53-54
(1934).
6 1 STAT. 285 (1792). Section 5 of the Ordinance of 1787 provided that laws
published by the governor and judges should be in force in the territory "unless
disapproved of by Congress."
7Laws, N.W. Terr. (Maxwell's Code, 1796) 54, effective Oct. 1, 1795.
Symmes and George Turner had replaced Parsons and Varnum, deceased.
8 Act of March 27, 1713. PuRDoN, ABRDGMENT OF THE LAWS OF PENNSYL-
VANIA 347-348 (1811).
921 JAc. I, c. 16, §§3-7 (1623). Both the English Act (§§1-2) and the
Pennsylvania laws (Act of March 26, 1785; Purdon, supra n. 8 at 349) included
limitations on actions for the recovery of land. These actions were excluded from
the territorial limitations act of 1795, as well as from that of 1788, supra n. 4.
See n. 12, infra.
1955] BdCKGROUND
of this act in 179910 was followed by the enactment in 1804 of the first
statute of limitations of the state of Ohio."
It is interesting that, in a pioneer community beset by difficulties usual
on the frontier, statutes of limitations were included in the earliest legis-
lation. There is no reason to suppose that St. Clair and the judges were
motivated by circumstances peculiar to them or to the territory, or by
anything other than a belief that the principle of limitations was sound."2
Statutes of limitations are, and have been, considered basic in our legal
system, as well as in others.' 3 Occasional intimations that they are con-
trary to the spirit of the law and not to be favored' 4 are refuted by the
persistence of these statutes through more than three hundred years of
Anglo-American law; and are overwhelmed by the weight of judicial
declarations attesting to the soundness of their policy.' 5
As with many things generally conceded to represent sound policy,
there is much relating to statutes of limitation which is merely assumed
and much which is only vaguely expressed. Most, if not all, of the de-
tailed questions of their application might be expected to depend for their
solutions on the purpose, or purposes, which the statutes are designed to
effect. But even if it is assumed that the effect of legislation, and of its
application by courts, is known, the determination of the purpose 'of
10 "Whereas in the opinion of the general assembly, the act entitled 'A law
for the limitation of actions' [is] unconstitutional . . . the same [is] hereby re-
pealed." Act of Dec. 19, 1799. Acts of First Session of General Assembly of the
Territory, p. 240.
11 2 Ohio Laws 60. Subsequent changes in the Ohio statutes, prior to the
adoption of the Code of Civil Procedure in 1853, may be traced through the
following: 7 v. 107 (1809), 8 v. 62 (1810), 22 v. 325 (1824), 28 v. 33 (1830),
29 v. 214 (1831). See also, 44 v. 76, 47 v. 54. The statute of limitations as enacted
in the Code of Civil Procedure, 51 v. 58, is the basis of our present OHIO REV. CoDE
§§2305.03 through 2305.22 (11218 through 11236). Citations to acts subsequent to
1853 are readily available in code compilations.
12This is not to say that these gentlemen were unaware of their circum-
stances. Neither the act of 1788 nor that of 1795 included any limitation on actions
to recover the possession of land, although both-the English and the Pennsylvania
laws did. See n. 9 supra. This limitation first appeared in the Ohio act of 1804,
2 v. 60. It was then set at twenty years, the English period (21 JAC. I, c. 16, §1).
The shift to twenty-one years was made in 1810. 8 v. 62, §2.
13 "They are found and approved in all systems of enlightened jurisprudence."
Lamkin v. Robinson, 10 Ohio N.P. (N.S.) 1, 106 N.E. 1065 (1910), quoting Wood
v. Carpenter, 101 U.S. 135 (1879).
14 See. Reed v. Clark, 3 McL. (U.S.) 480 (1844); Newsom's Adm'r. v. Rau,
18 Ohio 240 (1849); Sheets v. Baldwin's Adm'r., 12 Ohio 121 (1843); Wood v.
Ward, 1 Ohio Dec. Repr. 589 (1853).
15 See Guaranty Trust Co. v. U.S., 304 U.S. 126, 136 (1937); Campbell v.
Haverhill, 155 U.S. 610 (1895); McCluny v. Silliman, 28 U.S. 270 (1830); Bell
v. Morrison, 26 U.S. 360 (1828); Lile v. Powers, 8 Ohio Supp. 135, 24 Ohio Op. 124
(1942); Lamkin v. Robinson, 10 Ohio N.P. (N.S.) 1, 106 N.E. 1065 (1910) ;
Wolcott v. Holland, 5 Ohio Cir. Ct. (N.S.) 604 (1904). "Statutes of Limitations are
vital for the welfare of society and are favored in the law." Lamkin v. Robinson,
supra.
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statutes of limitations is not easy. Although occasional hints are found in
the statutes themselves, the frequency with which later legislatures have
enacted the substance of the English statute of limitations of 1623"s
suggests either that these bodies have at once seen, and recognized as valid,
the purpose of the English statute, or that they have accepted the principle
with little or no independent examination." Judicial declarations re-
specting the policy of statutes of limitations are numerous, but almost
embarrassingly repetitive. Sometimes these declarations may serve the
immediate purpose, but they are usually bare assertions offered without
supporting analysis.
One might approach the question inductively, on the premise that
the policy being forwarded may best be discovered by working backward
from what the courts have done; but here he will encounter another not
unusual difficulty-the courts have done different things in a given situ-
ation; and seemingly inconsistent things in different situations. It has
been said, perhaps with some overstatement, that there is a conflict of
judicial opinion on almost every question connected with the statute of
limitations;' 8 and that they "always have vexed the philosophical mind."'"
It may be that things would be clarified somewhat if it were recog-
nized, as it perhaps sometimes is not, that the policy of the statute of
limitations is not the furthering of a single purpose which may be ex-
pressed adequately in a phrase or two. Of course, the statute itself is not a
single piece of legislation dealing with a single thing. The range of its
several sections is virtually as broad as that of activity which may cause
litigation."0 There is no reason to ascribe precisely the same motive to all
of it. Further, such evidence as there is suggests that the statute, even as
applied to a single question, reflects a fairly complex mixture of purposes,
L6 21 JAC. I, c. 16 (1623).
17 "So firmly have statutes of limitations become imbedded in our law in the
course of centuries that legislature seldom reconsider them in the light of the
various functions that they actually perform." Developments--Statutes of Limita-
tions, 63 HARV. L. REv. 1177, 1185 (1950). For an exception, see the study of
agreements extending the statute of limitations conducted by the New York Law
Revision Commission. Report, 1947, pp. 133-160.
18 Ellicott v. Nicholls, 7 Gill (Md.) 85, 48 Am. Dec. 546 (1848). See Summers
v. Connolly, 159 Ohio St. 396, 112 N.E. 2d 391 (1953). In general no attempt is
made in this article to cite cases from other states. The judicial statements in the
Ohio and federal cases are, however, typical... See cases cited in 34 Am. Jul.,
Limitations of Actions §§9-14; 53 C.J.S., Limitations of Actions §1.
19 Jackson, J., in Chase Securities Co. v. Donaldson, 325 U.S. 304, 313, (1944).
20There are twenty sections in the Ohio Revised Code, Sections 2305.03
through 2305.22 (11218 through 11236), which may be regarded as the Ohio statute
of limitations for civil actions. Section 1.18 limits prosecution for misdemeanors
to three years after commission. Traditionally only those statutes which restrict
the time within which an action may be brought, which right of action would exist
in the absence of the statute, are regarded as "statutes of limitations." A statute
which creates a right of action unknown to the common law and, at the same time,
limits the time within which the action may be brought is regarded merely as
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some of which overlap and some of which may be partly inconsistent With
others. It is likely that if this multiplicity of purposes is recognized the
"philosophical mind" still will be vexed; but it may see what is vexing it.
The following propositions have appeared so frequently in opinions
that they must be taken to state at least a verbal consensus as to the policy
of the statutes?'
1. They are designed to protect against stale claims after
evidence has been lost, memories have faded and witnesses have
disappeared.
2. They are statutes of repose and not of presumption.
Most of the philosophy of statutes of limitations lurks somewhere
in these two assertions. They present not just two ideas, but several; and
there is no indication of the weight accorded to each. An attempt will be
made to consider separately some of the implications.
,- J - STALE CLAIMS.'"
Habitually this phrase is used in relation to statutes of limitations.2
Unlike bread or beer, claims do not become literally stale. The adjective,
then, either simply means "unenforceable," which of course is the issue,
or it is an attempt to include in one word the specific purposes of the
statute-an attempt which fails. So this gets us nowhere.
c - - MEMORIES HAVE FADED."
The proposition that statutes of limitations are designed, at least in
part, to protect against successful assertion of claims after 'evidence to
refute them has been lost, from one cause or another, is fairly obvious;2 3
and the validity of this general purpose hardly will be questioned. But,
in accepting it, it should be noted that its scope is not as great as that of
the statutes themselves. The concern is with preservation of a potential
defendant's evidence, not a plaintiff's; and it is limited to the protection
of defendants from "bad" claims-that is, claims which it is assumed he
affixing a condition to the right, rather than limiting it. I WooD, LIMITATIONS §1
(4th ed. 1916). See Developments-Statutes of Limitations, 63 HARV. L. REv. 1177,
1179 (1950). This technical distinction appears to have little to do with the
function of the time limit. Accordingly, such statutes can be added to the others
for this discussion.
21 These propositions are composites rather than direct quotes; but their
substance appears, wholly or in part, in many opinions, including those cited below.
22 See Chase Securities Co. v. Donaldson, 325 U.S. 304 (1944) ; Telegraphers
v. Ry. Express Agency, 3921 U.S. 342 (1943); Guaranty Trust Co. v. U.S., 304 U.S.
126, (1937) ; Bell v. Morrison, 26 U.S. 350 (1828) ; Summers v. Connolly, 159 Ohio
St. 396, 112 N.E. 2d 391 (1953).
23 "It is a wise and beneficial law, not designed merely to raise a presumption
of payment of a just debt, from lapse of time, but to afford security against stale
demands, after the true state of the transactions may have been forgotten or be
incapable of explanation by reason of the death or removal of witnesses." Story, J.
in Bell v. Morrison, 26 U.S. (1 Pet.) 350, 360 (1828).
"The difficulty of preserving evidence, the frailty of memory and the con-
tingency of the death of witnesses. .. " Minsall, J., Doyle v. West, 60 Ohio St. 438,
444, 54 N.E. 469 (1899).
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could have resisted successfully had evidence been available. If it is
assumed that a plaintiff's claim is "good," the defendant will be no worse
off no matter how much time has elapsed; he couldn't have defended
successfully in the beginning. Statutes of limitations probably are designed
to bar "good" as well as "bad" claims; 24 but the purpose in barring the
"good" is something other than protection against failure of evidence.
It has been remarked that the periods of limitation which differentiate
types of actions are determined with reference to the preservation of
evidence on which the actions depend.25 To some extent this is suggested
by the statutes themselves. In a broad sort of way shorter limitation periods
are prescribed for actions in which essential evidence rests in the minds of
witnesses, as in actions for slander; while longer periods apply to actions
based mainly on documents. But there is no reason to suppose that the
statutory periods bear any actual relation to the duration of memory, con-
tinued availability of witnesses, or time for which documents are, or can
be, preserved. And some aspects of the statutes appear inconsistent with
the hypothesis that those considerations have dictated the periods pre-
scribed. Why should actions for slander and actions for libel be subject to
the same period, as they are in Ohio?2 6 Why should it be supposed that
witnesses can remember the circumstances of an alleged oral contract for
six years," but those of an alleged false imprisonment only one ;28 or that
witnesses will become unavailable more quickly in one case than in the
other? It is apparent that something other than availability, or lack of
availability, of evidence lies back of the several different limitation periods
which may appear in the statutes of a single jurisdiction. 29
- - STATUTES OF REPOSE.2
A quite different, and much broader, purpose is suggested by the
statement found in a very large number of opinions that statutes of
limitations are statutes of "repose." 30 But this somewhat poetical word,
24 "The statute of limitations was not designed to protect persons from claims
fictitious in nature but from ancient claims, whether well or ill founded, which may
have been discharged but the evidence of discharge may be lost." Gray, J., in
Shepherd v. Thompson, 122 U.S. 231, 236 (1886), quoting Clementson v. Williams,
8 U.S. (8 branch) 72 (1807).
25- . . the periods of limitation are graduated mainly with regard to the
nature of the evidence on which the actions rest or by which they can be defeated."
Neilson v. Fry, 16 Ohio St. 552 (1866). See Developments--Statutes of Limitations,
63 HARV. L. REv. 1177, 1185 (1950).
26 OHio REv. CODE, §2305.11 (11225).
27 OHIO REv. CODE, §2305.07 (11222).
28 OHIO REV. CODE, §2305.11 (11225).
29 Surveys of limitation periods prescribed by the statutes of American juris-
dictions appear in Blume and George, Limitations and the Federal Courts, 49
MicH. L. REV. 937 (1951); Littell, A Comparison of the Statutes of Limitations,
21 IND. L.J. 23 (1945); and in Mix, State Statutes of Limitation: Contrasted and
Compared, 3 RocKY MT. L. REv. 106 (1930).
30 Guaranty Trust Co. v. U.S., 304 U.S. 126 (1937); U.S. v. Oregon Lumber
Co., 260 U.S. 290 (1922); Campbell v. Haverhill, 155 U.S. 610 (1895); Shepherd
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taken alone, is not very helpful. Repose for whom? For the courts, for
potential defendants, or for others?
The late Mr. Justice Jackson said that statutes of limitations are,
among other things, "practical and pragmatic devices to spare the courts
from litigation of stale claims."'" This has been vigorously denied by
Judge Hand:
It cannot be that statutes of limitations are in any degree
for the purpose of relieving courts of the trial of issues which
have become hard to decide by loss of evidence. Courts are
maintained to settle disputes no matter how parties may embroil
themselves; it would be a strange doctrine which forbade people
to deal with their affairs as they wish lest the judges should be
unduly vexed. 2
Strange doctrine or not, if sparing the courts is one of the purposes
of the statutes it's at least a fair bet that it hasn't worked. No one can tell,
of course, how much additional judicial effort would be required if there
were no statutes of limitations; but it may well be that it would not exceed
that expended in deciding legal questions engendered by the statutes
themselves.
The repose of individual defendants is a more complex purpose and,
perhaps, more debatable. Here the policy of repose overlaps partially, but
only partially, that of protecting defendants against loss of combative
evidence. If a claim is assumed to be "bad," the policy of protecting a
defendant from a failure of evidence and the policy which favors his
"repose" are very much the same. The thing most likely to keep him
awake, or from ordering his life on the assumption that he will not be
subjected to the claim, is lack of evidence to support the facts. If, on the
other hand, it is assumed that the claim against him is "good," we have
an entirely different question. Is it a purpose of statutes of limitations to
enable a person who has breached a contract, or who has committed a
tort or a lesser crime, to proceed, after a time, as though the incident had
not occurred? There is nothing in the statutes, and little in judicial as-
sertions,3 3 to suggest a negative answer to this question; but it has pro-
voked arguments on moral grounds which extend even to questions of the
proper application of Christian principles.34 Whatever the validity of these
v. Thompson, 122 U.S. 231 (1886); Bell v. Morrison, 26 U.S. 350 (1828); Lewis v.
Marshall, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 470 (1831); Summers v. Connolly, 159 Ohio St. 396,
112 N.E. 2d 391 (1953); Doyle v. West, 60 Ohio St. 438, 54 N.E. 469 (1899);
Kerper v. Wood, 48 Ohio St. 613, 29 N.E. 501 (1891) ; Neilson v. Fry, 16 Ohio St.
552 (1866); Lile v. Powers, 8 Ohio Supp. 135, 24 Ohio Op. 124 (1942); Common-
wealth Loan Co. v. Firestone, 47 Ohio L. Abs. 523, 72 N.E. 2d 912 (1947).
31 Chase Securities Co. v. Donaldson, 325 U.S. 304, 313 (1944).
32 U.S. v. Curtiss, 147 F. 2d 639, (2d Cir. 1945).
33 See note 14 supra.
34 "Christianity forbids us to attempt enforcing the payment of a debt which
time and misfortune have rendered the debtor unable to discharge." Best, C.J., in
A' Court v. Cross, 3 Bing. 329, 333 (1825).
"In the writer's experience, not infrequently, ifP not generally, the plea of the
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arguments, it can be conceded that one purpose of the statutes may be to
assure the repose of an individual, even as against just claims. It certainly
can be contended reasonably that a person is entitled to shape his affairs
on the assumption that a claim .against him, however just, will not be
pressed after being allowed to lie dormant for a considerable time. It may
even be contended that the word "repose" can be taken literally in this
situation-that relief of individuals from worry over past events is a
proper public purpose.
If the "repose" purpose is confined to solicitude for the welfare,
either economic or emotional, of individuals, and we are trying so to
confine it for the moment, it, like the other purposes considered so far,
operates in a scope more narrow than that of the statutes themselves.
There will be no interference with the repose of a potential defendant if
he does not know that a cause of action is outstanding against him. It may
be that in most situations he will know of the difficulty; but there are some
in which he will not. And it probably is safe to say, generally, that the
statutes run regardless of the knowledge of the potential defendant."5
Finally, it is suggested that the "repose" which statutes of limitations
are designed to assure is that of persons other than judges or of defendants
to particular actions. The word "society" may be used for identification. 6
Although society properly may be interested in the welfare of an indi-
vidual, as such, it is clear that the interest referred to here is that of those
persons who have dealings with others and, accordingly, are concerned in
the stability of the positions of those with whom they deal. Without this
stability there would be little repose for anyone.
The operation of the social purpose is especially evident in some in-
stances, such as the transfer of property, but it is difficult to imagine one
to which it does not apply. All business dealings of any consequence are
apt to depend on the financial stability of the parties; and even relations
which may be considered of small importance are posited upon the con-
tinued availability of the people involved." Nearly all legal actions affect
statute has no merits and the attempt to enforce an old debt in no way infringes
the principles of Christianity. The prudent man, an unpleasant fellow at best and
certainly no Christian, would of course never have allowed the debt to become
statute barred." 190 L.T. 303, 304 (1940).
35 In some cases involving mistaken boundary lines the running of the
statute has been made to depend upon the supposed state of mind of the defendant.
But these cases are in the minority and have been said to be erroneous on principle.
3 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY 785-791 (Casner ed. 1952).
36 Judicial declarations which go beyond the mere assertion, that statutes of
limitations are statutes of "repose" usually specify that they are designed to secure
the repose of "society" or of the "public." See Lewis v. Marshall, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.)
470 (1831); Summers v. Connolly, 159 Ohio St. 396, 112 N.E. 2d 391 (1953);
Doyle v. West, 60 Ohio St. 438, 54 N.E. 469 (1899); Lile v. Powers 8 Ohio Supp.
135, 24 Ohio Op. 124 ((1942).
37 If A, whom B has long recognized as dependable, has promised B that he
will mow B's lawn on Saturday, B will be annoyed if, on the day appointed, A is
picking peas at the workhouse.
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either the economic status or the personal freedom of the defendant; and
some affect both. Accordingly, the public has an interest in the speedy
appearance of actions against him.
This social interest in the state of a given person's affairs, translated
into a purpose of statutes of limitations, includes, necessarily, the purposes
which relate solely to the position oi the individual defendant. Stability for
him is stability for those with whom he deals. At the same time its scope
is wider than that of any of the individual purposes ascribed to the statutes.
The social purpose is not limited, as are the others, by concern whether a
particular claim against an individual defendant is assumed to be "good"
or "bad"; the disruption is the same with either. And it makes no differ-
ence whether the person directly affected knew of the claim against him,
except as his knowledge, or lack of it, possibly may be reflected in the
"front" which attends his dealings with others. Accordingly, the pro-
tection of the social interest in individual stability 8 is the purpose which
most nearly accords with the apparent scope of the statutes.
- - - AND NOT OF PRESUMPTION.'
To the assertion that statutes of limitations are statutes of "repose"
there is frequently added, as though by antithesis, "and not of pre-
sumption." 9 The meaning is that, contrary to some early expressions, 40
the operation of the statute is not posited on the assumption that a claim
or demand which has not been asserted over a relatively long period has, in
fact, been discharged. The denial of a presumption may be asserted as
relevant to questions of general theory, such as whether the statutes bar
"good" claims as well as "bad," 41 or to more narrow questions of applicaA-
tion, such as whether the operation of the statutes must be pleaded.
41
If the question were approached solely as a matter of guessing as to
probability, it may well be that most guesses would favor the "presump-
tion." But certainly failure to press a claim may be explained rationally
otherwise than by discharge. That many people are easy-going, or very
busy, or allergic to controversy, probably would not be seriously contested
by most. If these matters are considered, perhaps most votes will be
against the "presumption;" since, if the statutes reflect a presumption at
all, it must be conclusive.
On the other hand, the statement that statutes of limitations create
38 "Individual," here includes, of course, corporations, etc.
30 Shepherd v. Thompson, 122 U.S. 231 (1886); Bell v. Morrison, 26 U.S. 350
(1828); Summers v. Connolly, 159 Ohio St. 396, 112 N.E. 2d 391 (1953); Doyle
v. West, 60 Ohio St. 438 54 N.E. 469 (1899).
40 See 1 Woow, LiMrrATrONS §5 (4th ed. 1916).
41 See Bell v. Morrison, 26 U.S. 350, 360 (1828), quoted supra n. 23.
42 "The practical effect of the theory of repose in connection with the
statute of limitations is that the debtor has the option to assert the statute and
defeat recovery; but if he chooses to assert the statute as a defense, the result is
the same as though the presumption of payment and discharge were indulged."
Middleton, J., in Summers v. Connolly, 159 Ohio St. 396, 401, 112 N.E. 2d 391
(1953).
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a presumption of payment, or other satisfaction, after the lapse of the
prescribed period may be simply a way of saying that no action can then
be maintained 4 -- a proposition which merely restates the statute. So re-
garded it is not objectionable on the merits.
COUNTER PURPOSES
The above deals with policies, or purposes, which may be furthered
by placing limitations on the periods during which actions may be brought.
Some may be more persuasive than others and some have a wider applica-
tion than others; -but all suggest limitation. If they stood alone they would
dictate not only that actions be limited as to time but that they should
be prohibited. Of course there is an obvious counter policy, that of justice
to persons who have claims, which prevents that result and which operates
constantly on all of the limitation questions. For various reasons we want
to limit the time for bringing actions; but we do not want to do so at the
expense of fairness to those entitled to bring them." There are also
other counter policies, such as the protection of society against crime.
There are generally no limits on prosecutions for capital crimes; and this
must be because, in this instance, it is supposed that society's need for
protection outweighs its need for stability.
Accordingly there is a point, hard to locate but nevertheless present,
beyond which the purposes to be effected by statutes of limitations must
be abandoned.
CONCLUSION
Statutes of limitations are attempts to effect different purposes.
Among them are (1) the protection of individuals against the enforce-
ment of unjust or "fraudulent" claims against them which are based on
tiansactions so far in the past that evidence to combat them has been lost;
(2) encouragement of stability in the affairs of an individual, which
stability is desirable for the welfare of the individual, as such; and (3)
protection of the interest which all persons who deal with a given indi-
vidual have in the stability of his economic and pers6nal affairs.
Of these three purposes, the third clearly overlaps the other two
and extends beyond them. Thus, although the other purposes may be
conceded to be proper, the third is the most persuasive and should dominate
as a starting point in analysis of questions relating to limitation of actions.
This extends not only to specific applications of the statutes but also to the
content of the statutes themselves. As to content, it follows that the length
of the period, or periods, prescribed should be determined by reference to
the dominate purpose of social stability, rather than on the basis of a sup-
posed relation to the lesser purpose of protection against lost evidence-
43 See U.S. v. Oregon Lumber Co., 260 U.S. 290 (1922); Lamkin v. Robinson,
10 Ohio N.P. (N.S.) 1, 106 N.E. 1065 (1910).
44 From the beginning statutes of limitations, themselves, have included
provisions relieving persons under certain disabilities from their application.
OHIo REV. CODE, §2305.16 (11229) derives from the second section of the original
English statute, 21 JAc. I, c. 16.
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a relation which, as applied to the many periods found in present statutes,
is highly questionable. So viewed, it appears that the time limits pre-
scribed in the statutes generally should be shortened. 5 The purpose of
social stability points in only one direction: the shorter the better. The
only limit on this shortening process is the point at which the stability
purpose is outweighed by counter purposes. Accordingly, at least in civil
actions, the question of the limitation period to be prescribed becomes
essentially a question of how long a claimant should require, in all fair-
ness, to organize his forces and bring his action. On this basis it is
doubtful whether it would be necessary to divide actions into as many
classes as appear in present statutes, although some distinction likely will
be necessary; and it is highly doubtful whether the answer in any case
would be as long as twenty-one years.
The word "limitations" may be unfortunate. It suggests, probably
accurately, that thinking about the matter has begun with the proposition
that a person is entitled to bring an action any time he pleases; and that
this privilege will be cut off only after his delay has become unbearable,
for one reason or another. Perhaps this thinking is backwards.
45 The same suggestion is made in Littell, A Comparison of the Statutes of
Limitations, 21 IND. L J. 23, 38 (1945).
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